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Sex and the Immigration Laws
MAURICE A. ROBERTS*
INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the recent revelation of sexual escapades on Capi-
tol Hill, it is interesting to observe the tolerance displayed by Con-
gressmen, constituents, and columnists alike. The major question
concerning the extracurricular activities of the female congressional
aides involved has been, not "Does she or doesn't she?", but rather
"Does she or doesn't she type?" The focal point of inquiry is
whether the Government has in fact been harmed-that is, whether
there has been official use of the taxpayers' money by Congressmen
for their own personal, nongovernmental purposes. Apart from
that, as one columnist noted: "Most Americans are dutiful liberals
now, in the sense that they believe that what consenting adults,
including public figures, do behind closed doors and drawn shades
is not public business, if not done at public expense."1 Some com-
mentators have argued that Congressmen are only human, after all,
and should be judged by the same standards of moral conduct as
* Editor, Interpreter Releases, American Council for Nationalities
Service. J.D., Rutgers University Law School. Former Chairman, Board
of Immigration Appeals, United States Department of Justice, 1968-74.
The author wishes to acknowledge the contribution of Ms. Ann Burke,
Editorial Assistant, Interpreter Releases, in researching some of the mate-
rial included in this article.
1. Will, Washington Post, May 30, 1976, pt. B, at 7, cols. 5-6.
are generally applied.2 However, this brings to the fore the issue
of exactly what -the general moral standards are and how they are
ascertained.
A less tolerant attitude has been evinced by Congress toward ali-
ens seeking to enter the United States, to remain here permanently,
and to become naturalized. Congress has through the years ex-
hibited in legislation a deep-rooted interest in the sex lives and sex-
ual activities of aliens and has demanded increasingly high stand-
ards of conduct. As a result, Government officials engaged in the
administration and enforcement of the immigration and nationality
laws have frequently believed themselves duty bound to inquire
into the most intimate details of the sexual practices of those hap-
less aliens who appear before them, although these are matters
which most citizens would regard as purely personal and private.
Some of these inquiries are mandated by specific statutory refer-
ences to proscribed sexual activities or conditions, such as the provi-
sion excluding from admission to the United States aliens "afflicted
with... sexual deviation."3 Other probing questions are based on
statutory provisions directing the exclusion or deportation of aliens
convicted of crimes "involving moral turpitude,"4 many of which
are sexual. Various benefits under the immigration, as well as the
naturalization laws, are predicated on a showing of "good moral
character" 5 for a prescribed period of time. This amorphous stand-
ard is further complicated by a provision precluding such a showing
in the case of an alien who "during such period has committed adul-
2. See NSWWnEK, June 14, 1976, at 18: "The private life of the Ohio
Democrat was nobody's business but his own. The real issue was whether
he had paid for it out of the taxpayer's pocket."
See Germond, Washington Star, June 23, 1976, pt. A, at 3, col. 1: "What
this all means is that the politicians in the 'great congressional sex scan-
dals' should be judged just as anyone else in our society."
"Prior to the time when I was married and for an extended period of
time, I did have a relationship with Elizabeth Ray. I was legally separated
and single." (emphasis added). 122 CONG. REC. H 4895 (daily ed. May 25,
1976) (remarks of Representative Wayne Hayes).
3. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 212 (a) (4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (4), as amended 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (4) (1965) [The Immigration and
Nationality Act is hereinafter cited as L & N. Act.).
4. Id. §§ 212(a)'(9) & 241(a) (4), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a) (9) & 1251 (a) (4).
Section 212(a) (9) excludes not only aliens convicted of such crimes but
also "aliens who admit having committed such a crime, or aliens who admit
committing acts which constitute the essential elements of such a crime
5. E.g., id. § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (a) (suspension of deportation); id.
§ 244(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (voluntary departure in lieu of deportation);
id. § 249, 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (registry); id. § 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (a) (judicial
naturalization).
[voL. 14: 9, 1976J Sex and the Immigration Laws
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
tery." An alien's domestic activities may also come into focus if
a question is raised about the bona fides of a marriage through
which priority is sought in the issuance of an immigrant visa.1
Justice Cardozo, though dedicated to stability in the law, noted
that when a rule, after it has been duly tested by experience, has
been found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the
social welfare, there should be less hesitation in frank avowal and
full abandonment.... If judges have woefully misinterpreted the
mores of their day, or if the mores of their day are no longer those
of ours, they ought not to tie, in helpless submission, the hands of
their successors.8
However, as will be seen, the hands of both judges and administra-
tors can be effectively tied by legislative enactments which no
longer reflect the mores of the day.
This article will examine the various statutory provisions which
have provoked official interest in the sex lives of aliens and the
standards by which official judgments have been made. The ques-
tion of how realistic some of the standards are and the impact of
certain statutory provisions upon the overall problem of immigra-
tion law enforcement will also be discussed. Although most of the
items treated derive from provisions of the present Immigration and
Nationality Act, enacted in 1952, the provisions of prior legislation
are also germane, for the current law has no statute of limitations
and thus reaches back to make deportable any alien who "at the
time of entry was within one or more of the classes of aliens ex-
cludable by the law existing at the time of such entry."9
SPECIFIC STATUTORY SEX CLASSIFICATIONS
Prostitutes
The present statute, like its predecessors, has specific provisions
directed at prostitutes. Aliens are excluded from admission if they
are "prostitutes or have engaged in prostitution, or aliens coming
to the United States solely, principally, or incidentally to engage
in prostitution."'1 Rendered deportable are aliens who "by reason
6. Id. § 101(f) (2), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (2).
7. E.g., id. § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (b).
8. B. CAmnozo, THE NATURE OF TE JuDic-,L PROcEss 150, 152 (1921).
9. I. & N. Act § 241(a) (1), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1) (1970).
10. Id. § 212(a) (12), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (12).
of any conduct, behavior or activity at any time after entry became
a member of any of the classes specified" in the preceding sen-
tence.1 ' Because it is the alien's conduct, and not necessarily a con-
viction for prostitution, which triggers the immigration statute, in-
quiry into the private lives of aliens suspected of being or having
been prostitutes has long been countenanced.
Under the prior statute, reformed prostitutes were not excluded,12
and a single act of prostitution did not constitute "practicing prosti-
tution" within the meaning of that statute's provision for deporta-
tion after entry.13 The present statute, however, excludes aliens
who had abandoned the practice of prostitution before coming to
the United States, and it is considered immaterial that prostitution
was not a crime in the foreign country where the alien had plied
the trade.14 However, if prostitution was practiced abroad under
duress, it does not result in deportability. 1 Similarly, a single act
of prostitution after entry does not constitute "engaging in prosti-
tution" within the meaning of the present Act.1 The fact that
oral sodomy was involved did not alter the nature of the conduct
as prostitution within the meaning of the Act.1'7
The statutory provisions are directed not only at the prostitutes
themselves, but also at pimps, procurers, and others who derive
gain from commercialized sex.)8 However, an alien convicted under
the Mann Act'9 for transporting a female over interstate lines to
induce her to engage in illicit sexual intercourse with him was held
not to be deportable, for only fornication and not commercialized
vice was actually involved.20
Immoral Sexual Acts
The present statute specifically excludes from admission "[a] liens
coming to the United States to engage in any immoral sexual act."21
11. Id. § 241(a) (12), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (12).
12. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 875, as amended 8 U.S.C.§ 136 (1946) [The Immigration Act of 1917 is hereinafter cited as 1917
Act.]. See In re S., 1 I. & N. Dec. 378 (BIA, 1943).
13. 1917 Act § 19, 8 U.S.C. § 155. See In re B., 2 1. & N. Dec. 50 (BIA,
1944).
14. In re G., 5 I. & N. Dec. 559 (BIA, 1954).
15. In re M., 7 . & N. Dec. 251 (BIA, 1956).
16. In re T., 6 I. & N. Dec. 474 (BIA, 1955).
17. In re Dolhancey, 11 I. & N. Dec. 375 (BIA, 1965).
18. I. & N. Act §§ 212(a) (12) & 241(a) (12), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a) (12) &
1251(a) (12) (1970).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1948).
20. In re R., 6 I. & N. Dec. 444 (BIA, 1954).
21. I. & N. Act § 212(a) (13), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (13) (1970).
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Although questions might arise at first impression about what con-
stitutes an "immoral" sexual act, the meaning of the provision has
been crystallized by a long line of decisions. A similar provision
of the prior statute22 was construed as contemplating immoral pur-
poses of a character similar to prostitution and was held not to ap-
ply to extramarital relations short of concubinage. 23 Thus, an alien
returning to the United States to resume an extramarital relation-
ship was found admissible under this provision of the prior stat-
ute.24 Taking into account the legislative history of the 1952 Act
provision, the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) held that the
same construction should apply and that the provision in the 1952
Act does not bar aliens coming into the country to resume an
extramarital relationship.25
Sexual Deviates
Among the aliens excluded by the Immigration Act of 1917 were
"persons of constitutional psychopathic inferiority."26 This phrase
was held to encompass aliens who were homosexuals at the time
of entry while that Act was in effect.27 When the immigration laws
were codified in 1952, the excluding provision was changed to
"[a]liens afflicted with psychopathic personality .... ,,28 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the
phrase was unconstitutionally vague when it was sought to be ap-
plied to homosexuality.29 The Supreme Court remanded the case
22. Section 3 of the 1917 Act, 8 U.S.C. § 136(g) (1946), excluded
"[p]rostitutes, or persons coming into the United States for the purpose of
prostitution or for any other immoral purpose."
23. Hansen v. Haff, 291 U.S. 559 (1934).
24. Id. See In re M., 3 I. & N. Dec. 213 (BIA, 1948); In re D., 1 I. &
N. Dec. 373 (BIA, 1943); In re C.G., I I. & N. Dec. 70 (BIA, 1941).
25. In re B., 5 I. & N. Dec. 135 (BIA, 1953). The Board also held that,
even if the statute was designed to reach people coming to resume merely
an extramarital sexual relationship, their sex acts would not be considered
immoral under Petitions of Rudder, 159 F.2d 695 (2d Cir. 1947). See also
In re R., 6 I. & N. Dec. 444 (BIA, 1954), holding that simple acts of fornica-
tion unconnected with prostitution or commercialized vice did not bring an
alien within the 1952 Act provision, despite his conviction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2421 (1948) for having transported a female over interstate lines for pur-
poses of illicit sexual intercourse with him.
26. Act of 1917 § 3, 8 U.S.C. § 136 (a) (1946).
27. In re Steele, 12 L & N. Dec. 302 (BIA, 1967); In re La Rochelle, 11
I. & N. Dec. 436 (BIA, 1965).
28. I. & N. Act § 212(a) (4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)'(4) (1970).
29. Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1962).
without deciding the constitutional issue.3 0 However, in a later
case, the Supreme Court construed the provision to encompass ho-
mosexuals and held that the provision, so construed, was not consti-
tutionally defective. 31 The Court rejected the argument that the
phrase "psychopathic personality" is a medically ambiguous term,
stating that the test is what Congress intended, not what differing
psychiatrists might think. Congress, said the Court, "was not lay-
ing down a clinical test, but an exclusionary standard which it de-
clared to be inclusive of those having homosexual and perverted
characteristics.13 2 As amended in 1965, the statute now explicitly
reaches aliens "afflicted with psychopathic personality or with sex-
ual deviation."33
Aliens with homosexual tendencies who engaged in homosexual
acts prior to entry were held to be excludable (and hence deport-
able after entry) under the "psychopathic personality" provision
even before it was amended specifically to cover sexual deviates. 84
Sexual deviation has been held to encompass exhibitionism, sexual
sadism, fetishism, transvestism, and pedophilia.35
The determination of excludability has frequently involved a de-
tailed examination of the alien's sex life. The consequences of the
examination vary, depending on the nature of the evidence and the
weight it is given. The alien is excludable if the condition was
found to exist at the time of the alien's entry into the United
States. 36
Polygamists
The Immigration Act of 1917 excluded "[p] olygamists or persons
30. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963). The Court there held that
on the facts remand was required to determine whether an "entry" had been
made within the meaning of the immigration laws. It was later held ad-
ministratively that the evidence of the alien's homosexual tendencies and
acts prior to his original entry in 1952 did not establish constitutional psy-
chopathic inferiority under the then pertinent 1917 Act. In re Fleuti, 12
I. & N. Dec. 308 (BIA, 1965).
31. Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
32. Id. at 124.
33. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, 79 Stat. 919, Pub. L. No. 89-236, amending 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182 (a) (4) (1952).
34. Quiroz v. Neelly, 291 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1961); In re Lavoie, 12 I. & N.
Dec. 821 (1968), affd sub nom. Lavoie v. INS, 418 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970); In re Lavoie, 11 I. & N. Dec. 224 (BIA,
1965); In re S., 8 I. & N. Dec. 409 (BIA, 1959); In re P., 7 I. & N. Dec. 258
(BIA, 1956).
35. In re R., 9 I. & N. Dec. 393 (BIA, 1961).
36. In re Lavoie, 12 I. & N. Dec. 821 (BIA, 1968), aff'd sub nom. Lavoie
v. INS, 418 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970); In
re Fleuti, 12 I. & N. Dec. 303 (BIA, 1965).
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who practice polygamy or believe in or advocate the practice of
polygamy."37 The terminology is altered slightly by the current
Act, which applies to "[a] liens who are polygamists or who practice
polygamy or advocate the practice of polygamy.138 It has been held
that polygamy and bigamy are not synonymous. The mere fact
that an alien had two wives did not prove polygamy because the
alien had undertaken a second marriage without the benefit of a
divorce from his first wife. The Immigration and Naturalization
Service (Service) must demonstrate that the alien subscribes to
the historical custom or religious practice of polygamy, "which the
Mormons had typified in this country until the statutory abolition
of polygamy in the latter part of the 19th century"39 in order to
sustain a charge.
CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE
Both current and past immigration statutes provide for the exclu-
sion and deportation of aliens convicted of crimes involving "moral
turpitude." If the Service is seeking to expel an alien already in
the United States because of criminal conduct which occurred after
entry, the alien must have been convicted of the crime.40 When
an alien seeks to enter the United States, exclusion may be based
not only on conviction of a crime but also on the alien's admission
that he has committed the crime.41 When deportability is charged,
based upon a criminal conviction, moral turpitude is determined by
the statutory or common-law elements of the crime as ascertained
from the record in the criminal proceedings. Inquiry may not ordi-
narily be made outside this record during the deportation proceed-
ings.42 In exclusion proceedings involving a foreign conviction, the
nature of the crime may be developed in certain circumstances by
evidence adduced at the exclusion hearing.4 3 If exclusion is
founded on the alien's admission of guilt, the alien's statements, ei-
37. Act of 1917. § 3, 8 U.S.C. § 136(f) (1946).
38. I. & N. Act § 212 (a) (11), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (11) (1970).
39. In re G., 6 L & N. Dec. 10-11 (BIA, 1953).
40. 1. & N. Act § 241(a) (4), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (4) (1970); Act of 1917§ 19, 8 U.S.C. § 155(a) (1946).
41. I. & N. Act § 212(a) (9), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (9) (1970); Act of 1917§ 3, 8 U.S.C. § 136 (e) (1946).
42. United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uh, 210 F. 860 (2d Cir. 1914); United
States ex rel. Manzella v. Zimmerman, 71 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Pa. 1947). But
see In re Baker, I.D. No. 2310 (BIA, 1974).
43. In re T., 2 I. & N. Dec. 22 (1944).
ther during the prehearmg investigation or at the exclusion hearing
itself, are obviously evidentiary. Because many crimes indicating
moral turpitude involve sexual conduct of various sorts, inquiry
into an alien's sex life is sometimes necessary to determine his ad-
missibility or deportability under these statutory provisions.
While much criticism has been directed at the phrase "crime in-
volving moral turpitude" because of its lack of precision, a workable
definition has long been used in immigration cases.44 The Supreme
Court has upheld the use of the phrase against charges that it is
constitutionally void for vagueness.45  The application of the phrase
to various crimes in the context of the immigration laws will now
be examined.
Abortion
An early decision held without discussion that a 1939 conviction
of abortion under a New York statute involved moral turpitude.46
Recently the Board receded from this position in a case involving
an alien who had been convicted in Mexico of having an abortion.
The record reflected that the abortion took place during the first
trimester of pregnancy. The Board concluded that moral turpitude
was not involved because the abortion would not have been a crime
in this country.4
Adultery
Early cases held, without extended discussion, that adultery was
a crime involving moral turpitude. In one case, an alien, separated
from his wife who resided in Paris and who was contemplating
divorce, had lived in New York with another woman and had gone
44. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Manzella v. Zimmerman, 71 F. Supp.
534, 537 (E.D. Pa. 1947), where the court stated:
The authorities are in agreement ... that moral turpitude is evi-denced by an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private
and social duties which according to the accepted standards of the
time a man owes to his fellowman or to society in general. It has
been said that moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself
regardless of the fact whether it is punishable by law. The doing
of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute, fixes the moral
turpitude.(footnotes omitted).
45. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951). See also Marciano v. INS,
450 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 997 (1972).
46. In re M., 2 I. & N. Dec. 525 (BIA, 1946).
47. In re Morales & Salinas, files A-10721162 & A-1304267 (BIA, 1973 &
1974). The Board relied upon the standard enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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abroad with her. In exclusion proceedings on their return, he ad-
mitted committing adultery and was excluded. On judicial review
the exclusion order was sustained. The court found that his con-
duct was punishable as adultery under New York penal law and
that adultery involves moral turpitude. However, the court held
that he was not inadmissible as a person coming for an immoral
purpose, for he had testified he would refrain from relations with
his companion until after his wife divorced him.48 In another case,
a Massachusetts adultery conviction prior to the alien's reentry was
held to be for a crime involving moral turpitude and deportability
was sustained.49 A Connecticut conviction for adultery also was
held to involve moral turpitude according to the Board, which
stated, "The conviction for adultery presents no problem since it
dearly involves moral turpitude."50 Current administrative policy
is not to sustain a charge of exclusion or deportation based upon
an alien's admission of adultery unless he has been convicted of that
crime.51
A sexual relationship between unmarried people who are living
together has sometimes resulted in conviction under various state
statutes punishing "open lewdness" 52 or "lewd and lascivious cohab-
itation.' '5 3 The Board has held that such convictions involve moral
turpitude. Lewd and lascivious cohabitation "is considered to be
a more heinous offense than either adultery or bigamy, offenses
which in Massachusetts do not require an evil intent."54
Bastardy
The Board has held that a conviction of bastardy is not a crime
involving moral turpitude, for bastardy is a civil proceeding to de-
termine paternity and to fix the terms of a support order; it is not
a crime. Despite the fact that fornication is involved, the Board
has stated that bastardy does not indicate moral turpitude.55
48. United States ex rel. Tourney v. Reimer, 8 F. Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y.
1934).
49. In re A., 3 I. & N. Dec. 168 (BIA, 1948).
50. In re H., 7 I. & N. Dec. 617 (BIA, 1957).
51. In re A., 3 I. & N. Dec. 168 (BIA, 1948).
52. In re C., 3 I. & N. Dec. 790 (BIA, 1949) (New Jersey).
53. In re M., 2 L & N. Dec. 530 (BIA, 1946) (Massachusetts).
54. Id. at 531.
55. In Te D., 1 L & N. Dec. 186 (BIA, 1941).
Bigamy
Bigamy may or may not involve moral turpitude, depending upon
whether mens rea is an essential ingredient of the crime. An early
case upheld a deportation order based on a Canadian bigamy con-
viction. The alien had married his second wife in Canada while
married to his first wife in England. Because he knew he was still
married to his wife in England, the court held that the crime in-
volved moral turpitude and that his first wife's unfaithfulness did
not excuse his conduct.5 6 In a later case, another court held that
the conviction of an alien who had remarried in Canada in the rea-
sonable (though mistaken) belief that his first wife had divorced
him was not a conviction involving moral turpitude, for in Canada
mens rea was not an essential ingredient of the crime.51 Similarly,
a conviction in Massachusetts for polygamy was held not to involve
moral turpitude because under Massachusetts law mens rea was not
an essential element of the crime.58 However, when the Board ap-
plied the same test to an admission of bigamy in Nevada, the deci-
sion was reversed by the Attorney General, who stated, "To hold
that bigamy is not a crime involving moral turpitude is contrary
to the accepted standards of morals."159
An alien who admitted committing bigamy in California prior to
his reentry was held to be ineligible for suspension of deportation
because bigamy was considered a crime involving moral turpitude.°0
A married alien posing as single who entered into a sham marriage
in Mexico with her brother, a United States citizen, for the purpose
of obtaining a nonquota immigrant visa admitted to immigration
officers after entry that she had committed incest and bigamy. Be-
cause the record showed that she had not in fact lived with or had
sexual relations with her brother, the Board held that she had not
committed incest. However, she was found inadmissible because
she had in fact committed bigamy in Mexico and that was a crime
involving moral turpitude. 61
Fornication
Despite early holdings that sexual conduct amounting to lewdness
56. Whitty v. Weedin, 68 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1933).
57. Forbes v. Brownell, 149 F. Supp. 343 (D.D.C. 1957).
58. In re S., 1 I. & N. Dec. 314 (BIA, 1942).
59. In re E., 2 L & N. Dec. 328, 338 (1945).
60. Gonzales-Martinez v. Landon, 203 F.2d 196 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 345 U.S. 998 (1953).
61. In re C., 1 I. & N. Dec. 525 (1943).
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involves moral turpitude, 2 in recent years courts have generally
held that fornication is not a crime involving moral turpitude. 3 A
conviction under the Mann Act6 4 was held not to involve moral
turpitude when the record disclosed that what actually transpired
was not prostitution or commercialized vice but simply fornication.
The Board has concluded that "simple fornication does not involve
moral turpitude."65 However, when the sexual relationship in-
volves cohabitation or other elements that lead to a conviction of
"open lewdness" 66 or "lewd and lascivious cohabitation,"' 7 moral
turpitude has been found.
Homosexual Offenses
Crimes based on deviant sexual behavior, even when it is prac-
ticed by consenting adults, have generally been considered to in-
volve moral turpitude. Although the crimes themselves have car-
ried various labels, such as "disorderly conduct" or "open and gross
lewdness," they have been regarded as turpitudinous if deviant sex-
ual conduct is an essential element. In a case based on an alien's
conviction of solicitation to commit sodomy, moral turpitude was
assumed.68 A conviction of disorderly conduct has been found to
involve moral turpitude when the elements of the offense involved
loitering "about a public place soliciting men for the purpose of
committing a crime against nature or other lewdness."6 9
The Board held in In re Z. that moral turpitude was not involved
in a conviction under a Canadian statute punishing the "commission
by any male person of any acts of gross indecency with another
male person. ' 70 The record of conviction did not describe the spe-
62. See, e.g., Lane ex rel. Cronin v. Tillinghast, 38 F.2d 231 (1st Cir.
1930).
63. In re D., 1 I. & N. Dec. 186 (BIA, 1941).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1948).
65. In re R., 6 I. & N. Dec. 444, 454 (BIA, 1954).
66. In re C., 3 I. & N. Dec. 790 (BIA, 1949).
67. In re Xi, 2 I. &. N. Dec. 530 (BIA, 1946).
68. In re K., 3 L & N. Dec. 575 (BIA, 1949).
69. Hudson v. Esperdy, 290 F.2d 879, 880 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
918 (1961); Wyngaard v. Kennedy, 295 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 368 U.S. 926 (1961); Babouris v. Esperdy, 269 F.2d 621 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 913 (1959); United States v. Flores-Rodreguez, 237
F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1956); In re Alfonso-Bermudez, 12 I. & N. Dec. 225 (BIA,
1967); In re G., 7 1. & N. Dec. 520 (BIA, 1957).
70. 2 1. & N. Dec. 316, 317 (BIA, 1945).
cific conduct, and the Board refused to conclude that the offense
involved moral turpitude because of the absence of any definition
of "gross indecency." The Board later retreated from its position
in another case arising under the same statute in which the specific
conduct was not revealed. The Board held that the gross indecency
crime necessarily involves moral turpitude, for its examination of
the reported cases failed to reveal any case in which a conviction
occurred under this section on facts which would not have involved
moral turpitude.71
Moral turpitude was not found in a conviction under a Michigan
statute which punished "gross indecency" because the statute did
not define the term "gross indecency" and the specific acts involved
were not charged in the indictment.72 However, in another case
involving the same statute, moral turpitude was found, for the alien
admitted that he had engaged in mutual masturbation, an act which
the Board characterized as "vile, base, depraved and contrary to the
tenets of society in and of [itself]." 73 Admitted acts of sodomy
were also held to be sufficient to sustain a finding of moral turpi-
tude when the alien admitted the commission of the crime.7 4 More
recently, a conviction under the Virginia sodomy statute of consen-
sual, heterosexual sodomy by unmarried people was held to be a
crime involving moral turpitude.75
The trend in recent decisions has been to consider private, con-
sensual, unorthodox heterosexual behavior as beyond the reach of
the criminal laws when the people involved are married.70 The ra-
tionale behind these decisions has been that the marital relation is
protected by the right of privacy enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Griswold v. Connecticut.77 However, the same right of privacy
has been held unavailable if the parties are unmarried.7 Thus
71. In re H1, 7 I. & N. Dec. 359 (BIA, 1956).
72. In re S., 5 I. & N. Dec. 576 (BIA, 1953).
73. In re W., 5 I. & N. Dec. 578 (BIA, 1953).
74. In re S., 8 I. & N. Dec. 409 (BIA, 1959).
75. Velez-Lozano v. INS, 463 F.2d 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
76. Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
847 (1968); Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), va-
cated sub nom. Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S. 989 (1971); State v. Lair, 62
N.J. 388, 301 A.2d 748 (1973).
77. 381 U.S. 478 (1965).
78. United States v. 'Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 606 (MD. Pa. 1973); Raphael
v. Hogan, 305 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Dixon v. State, 256 Ind. 266,
268 NXE.2d 84 (1971); Hughes v. State, 14 Md. 497, 287 A.2d 299,
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1025 (1972); State v. Lair, 62 N.J. 388, 301 A.2d 748(1973); Canfield v. State, 506 P.2d 987 (Okla. Crim. 1973); Warner v. State,
489 P.2d 526 (Okla. Crim. 1971); Pruett v. State, 463 S.W.2d 191 (Tex.
Crim.), appeal dismissed, 402 U.S. 902, reh. denied, 403 U.S. 912 (1970).
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whenever the parties are not married to each other, an alien
participating in unorthodox sex practices will probably confront
not only the rigors of the criminal law but also the punishment
of deportation.
Incest
Whether a conviction for incest demonstrates moral turpitude de-
pends on the statute involved and the facts of each case. In one
case, a conviction for incest under an Ohio statute was held to show
moral turpitude when the people involved were stepfather and
stepdaughter.7 9 However, an alien's conviction of incest under a
Washington statute based on his marriage and sexual relations with
his niece was found not to involve moral turpitude because in many
other states such marriages are valid.80 A married alien who ad-
mitted committing incest and bigamy in order to obtain a nonquota
visa was found not to have engaged in turpitudinous conduct be-
cause she had neither lived with nor had sexual relations with her
brother.81
Rape and Statutory Rape
A conviction of common-law-i.e., forcible and unconsented-
rape clearly involves moral turpitude.8 2 Similarly, indecent assault
has been held to be a crime involving moral turpitude when force
was used with an intent to rape.83 Additionally assault with intent
to commit rape and attempted rape are crimes involving moral tur-
pitude.84
Statutory rape is also considered a crime involving moral turpi-
tude, for some statutes conclusively presume that consent cannot
be given by a person whose judgment is impaired or by a minor
under the age of consent. If the victims are minors under the age
of consent, the crime has been held to involve moral turpitude re-
gardless of the label attached to the crime, whether it is "carnal
79. In re Y., 3 I. & N. Dec. 544 (BIA, 1949).
80. In re B., 2 I. & N. Dec. 617 (BIA, 1946).
81. In re C., L & N. Dec. 525 (1943).
82. Ng Sui Wing v. United States, 46 F.2d 755 (7th Cir. 1931); In re D.,
3 I. & N. Dec. 480 (BIA, 1949): "There is no question that the crime in-
volves moral turpitude."
83. In re Z., 7 I. & N. Dec. 253 (BIA, 1956); In re S., 5 I. & N. Dec. 636
(BIA, 1954); In re B., 3 I. & N. Dec. 1 (BIA, 1947).
84. In re B., 5 L & N. Dec. 533 (BIA, 1953); In re M., 2 I. & N. Dec.
629 (BIA, 1946).
knowledge," "carnal abuse," "contributing to the delinquency of a
minor," or another similar term.
In most of the cases, the alien involved was a male who had sex-
ual relations or other forbidden sexual contacts with a female under
the statutory age of consent. In one case85 mens rea was not an
essential element of the crime as defined by the state statute, and
even though the alien claimed he was ignorant of the female's age,
the Board held that "mistaking the age of the girl in a statutory
rape case is not an innocent mistake of fact. The mistake is not
between an innocent act and a guilty one, but only in regard to
the nature of the wrong."86
Moral turpitude was also found in a case in which the alien was
convicted of having sexual intercourse with a woman he knew to
be feebleminded; the Board concluded that because the offense was
the equivalent of rape, it necessarily demonstrated moral turpi-
tude.8 7 When minors under the age of consent were involved, con-
victions for contributing to the delinquency of a minor were held
to involve moral turpitude if the record disclosed acts of intercourse
or other forbidden contacts.8 8 However, when the statutory lan-
guage did not specify the elements of the offense and the record
did not disclose the nature of the crime, moral turpitude was not
found.8 9 Thus, in one case, in which the alien was convicted for
keeping a delinquent child, aged sixteen, in a hotel room for several
hours, no moral turpitude was found because the record did not
disclose what happened in the hotel room.90 In another case, no
moral turpitude was found when the alien had been convicted of
encouraging a fourteen-year-old girl to stay out of school by taking
her for an automobile ride.91
Convictions for carnal abuse,92 carnal knowledge,93 and indecent
85. In re Dingena, 11 I. & N. Dec. 723 (BIA, 1966).
86. Id. at 728.
87. In re M., 2 . & N. Dec. 17 (BA, 1944).
88. Glaros v. INS, 416 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1969); Marinelli v. Ryan, 285
F.2d 474 (2d Cir. 1961) (involving touching a boy under sixteen); Orlando
v. Robinson, 262 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1959); In re Wood, 12 I. & N. Dec. 170(BIA, 1967); In re C., 5 I. & N. Dec. 65 (BIA, 1953); In re R.P., 4 I. &
N. Dec. 607 (BIA, 1952); In re F., 2 1. & N. Dec. 610 (BIA, 1946).
89. In re P., 2 I. & N. Dec. 117 (BIA, 1944); In re V.T., 2 I. & N. Dec.
213 (BIA, 1944); In re C., 2 L & N. Dec. 220 (BIA, 1944).
90. In re Y., 1 I. & N. Dec. 662 (BIA, 1943).
91. In re C., 2 I. & N. Dec. 220 (BIA, 1944).
92. In re M., 9 I. & N. Dec. 452 (BA, 1961); In re P., 5 I. & N. Dec. 392(BA), affd sub. noma. Pino v. Nicolls, 119 F. Supp. 122 (D. Mass,. 1953),
aff'd, 215 F.2d 237 (1st Cir. 1954), rev'd on other grounds sub noam. Pino v.
Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955).
93. Bendel v. Nagel, 17 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1927); In re M., 9 I. & N. Dec.
452 (BIA, 1961).
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exposure 94 have been judged by similar standards. In one early
case, the Board found moral turpitude in a conviction for indecent
exposure under a Michigan statute when the information charged
design without specifying the acts committed, for the statute was
construed as implying an evil intent.9 5 However, this conclusion
was overruled in later decisions construing the same and similar
statutes as not requiring any specific criminal intent.9 6 In one un-
usual case involving a female alien moral turpitude was found for
conviction under a divisible Canadian statute when the basis of the
conviction was her sexual intercourse with a juvenile male.9 7
The fact that the alien did not know that the woman involved
was under the age of consent has been held to be no defense to
the criminal charge and irrelevant to the question of turpitude.9 8
Some judges have found the question of moral turpitude a trouble-
some one when the statutory age of consent has been relatively
high. Thus, the Board found moral turpitude in a conviction for
contributing to the delinquency of a minor, based on the alien's in-
tercourse with a nineteen-year-old woman, while the court in an
unreported opinion set aside the deportation order because the rec-
ord did not show that the alien had reason to know that the woman
was under twenty-one or that she was not a prostitute.99 Recently,
in a case involving a conviction of statutory rape under a Minnesota
statute, which fixes the age of consent at eighteen, the dissenting
judge contended that the actual facts should be litigated in the de-
portation proceedings so that the question of the alien's moral cul-
94. In re Garcia, 11 L & N. Dec. 521 (BIA, 1966); In re H., 7 I. & N.
Dec. 301 '(BIA, 1956).
95. In re R., 2 1. & N. Dec. 633 (BIA, 1946).
96. In re Mueller, 11 I. & N. Dec. 263 (BIA, 1965); In re H., 7 I. & N.
Dec. 301 (BIA, 1956).
97. In re W., 5 L & N. Dec. 239 (BIA, 1953).
98. Marciano v. INS, 450 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
997 (1972); In re P., 5 I. & N. Dec. 392 (BIA, 1953), affd sub nom. Pino
v. Nicolls, 119 F. Supp. 122 (D. Mass.), affd, 215 F.2d 237 (1st Cir.
1954), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955).
99. In re P., 3 I. & N. Dec. 290 (BIA, 1949); see Pardini v. Shaughnessy
(S.D.N.Y., August 2, 1949), referred to in In re P., 3 I. & N. Dec 290,
299 (BIA, 1949), and distinguished in In re R.P., 4 I. & N. Dec. 607,
609 (BIA, 1952).
pability could be determined. 10 0 In dissent Judge Eisele stated: "I
seriously doubt that in today's society an instance of consensual in-
tercourse necessarily involves moral turpitude just because the
state in which the act took place has raised the age of consent to
eighteen years."''1
Recent studies indicate that more female minors now engage in
premarital sexual relations at an increasingly early age than had
been previously thought. In a survey of more than 100,000 women
subscribers to Redbook magazine, 93 percent of those responding
who married after the end of 1973 had experienced premarital sex-
ual intercourse. Women now twenty-five or older who had no edu-
cation beyond high school reported that the average age at first in-
tercourse was seventeen; for those currently under twenty-five in-
tercourse first occurred at sixteen. 10 2 For those who consider cur-
rent mores an element in evaluating societal morality, the implica-
tions are revealing.
Prostitution
Prostitutes and their associates have been convicted under vari-
ous statutes which have been held to involve moral turpitude be-
cause of the nature of the sexual activity.103  Thus, turpitude was
found under a Massachusetts statute pursuant to which an alien
was charged with being "a lewd, wanton and lascivious person in
speech and behaviour,'1 04 and under a New Jersey statute punish-
ing open lewdness when the indictment charged that the alien and
the woman had been living together in open fornication and adul-
tery without being married to each other.10 5 However, a Connecti-
cut statute punishing "lascivious carriage" was held not to involve
moral turpitude, for the phrase was undefined, and court decisions
were not clear about the nature of the acts prosecutable.106 Simi-
larly, a conviction of "vagrancy, lewd [sic]" under a California stat-
100. Marciano v. INS, 450 F.2d 1022, 1026-31 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 997 (1972).
101. Id. at 1031 (dissenting opinion).
102. Levin, The Redbook Report on Premarital and Extramarital Sex,
REmoox, Oct. 1975, at 33.
103. In re Lambert, 11 I. & N. Dec. 340 (BIA, 1965); In re A., 5 I. &
N. Dec. 546 (BIA, 1953); In re W., 4 I. & N. Dec. 401 (BIA, 1951); In re
S.L., 3 I. & N. Dec. 396 (BIA, 1949) (pandering); In re W., 3 I. & N. Dec.
231 (BIA, 1948); In re P., 3 I. & N. Dec. 20 (BIA, 1947).
104. Lane ex rel. Cronin v. Tillinghast, 38 F.2d 231 (1st Cir. 1930); In
re A., 3 I. & N. Dec. 168 (BIA, 1948) (same); In re M., 2 I. & N. Dec. 530
(BIA, 1946) (lewd and lascivious cohabitation).
105. In re C., 3 I. & N. Dec. 790 (BIA, 1949).
106. In re H., 7 I. & N. Dec. 616 (BIA, 1957).
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ute was considered not to manifest moral turpitude when the stat-
ute did not define the offense and punished conditions which did
not inherently involve moral turpitude.10 7 Again, a Mann Act con-
viction was also held not to involve turpitudinous conduct when
the record revealed that the transportation was for purposes of sim-




The large number of decisions both reported and unreported 0 9
indicate that the interest of the INS in the sex lives of the aliens
who come before it is generated most frequently by the statutory
requirement of "good moral character" found in various parts of
the immigration and nationality laws. A tremendous amount of
time and effort is consumed by the Government in investigating,
assembling evidence, and adjudicating such issues. This effort in-
cludes the work of Service investigators, adjudicators, naturaliza-
tion examiners, trial attorneys, immigration judges, appellate trial
attorneys, the Board, reviewing and naturalization courts, and their
supporting staffs.
Good moral character is not required of an alien seeking to enter
the United States. Regardless of the status under which he is seek-
ing admission for permanent entry, bad moral character is not, as
such, a statutory bar. It is only if the alien's conduct or condition
places him within one of the excludable classes defined in the stat-
ute that his character is relevant to his right to enter.
Once the alien has entered the United States, good moral charac-
ter for a specified period (the statutory period) is a prerequisite
for the receipt of important benefits under the immigration and na-
tionality laws. If the alien is a permanent resident and desires to
become a citizen, he must establish good moral character for the
107. In re G.R., 5 I. & N. Dec. 19 (BIA, 1953).
108. In re R., 6 1. & N. Dec. 444 (BIA, 1944).
109. It is interesting to note the large number of unreported decisions
referred to in the Service's Interpretations dealing with the subject of good
moral character. INS, INTEnPRETATiONS § 316.1(e) (f) (g), at 5245 et seq.
(1974).
statutory period.110 If he is here illegally or otherwise lacks perma-
nent resident status, the statute requires the alien to prove good
moral character for the statutory period if he seeks voluntary de-
parture in lieu of deportation," or if he seeks suspension of depor-
tation1 2 or creation of a record of lawful admission for permanent
residence. 113 If an immigrant visa is readily available and if he
seeks adjustment of status without leaving the country, good moral
character is not a statutory prerequisite although it is considered
an important element in the exercise of administrative discretion
on the issue of whether to grant this form of relief.114
Because the requirement of good moral character is the same in
all the statutory provisions referred to, logically the same standards
for judgment should apply regardless of which section is invoked."15
Therefore, in the discussion which follows cases will be cited with-
out necessarily differentiating among the various immigration and
naturalization provisions involved.
Standards
Not until the 1952 Act did Congress establish criteria for judging
whether the good moral character requirement has been met. The
statutory standard is purely negative-i.e., it sets forth certain acts
or conditions which preclude a finding of good moral character, re-
110. I. & N. Act § 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1970). The good-moral-
character requirement has been imbedded in our naturalization laws since
the first statute on the subject, Act of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat.
414.
111. I. & N. Act § 244(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1970). For further discus-
sion on voluntary departure, see Wasserman, Practical Aspects of Repre-
senting an Alien at a Deportation Hearing, 14 SAN DGGo L. REv. 111, (1976);
Comment, Suspension of Deportation: Illusory Relief, id. at 229.
112. I. & N. Act § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1970). For a full discus-
sion of suspension of deportation, see Comment, Suspension of Deportation:
Illusory Relief, 14 SAN Dimo L. REv. 229 (1976). See also Wasserman,
Practical Aspects of Representing an Alien at a Deportation Hearing, id.
at 111.
113. I. & N. Act § 249, 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (1970). For further discussion of
the registry procedure, see Wasserman, Practical Aspects of Representing
an Alien at a Deportation Hearings, 14 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 111 (1976); Com-
ment, How to Immigrate to the United States: A Practical Guide for the
Attorney, id. at 193.
114. In re Francois, 10 I. & N. Dec. 168 (BIA, 1963); In re S., 8 I. & N.
Dec. 234 (BIA, 1958). For further discussion of adjustment of status, see
Wasserman, Practical Aspects of Representing an Alien at a Deportation
Hearings, 14 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 111 (1976); Comment, How to Immigrate
to the United States: A Practical Guide for the Attorney, id. at 193.
115. Petition of O.N., 233 F. Supp. 504, 506-07 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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gardless of what the facts might otherwise indicate.116 Thus, courts
and other tribunals have been required throughout the years to de-
velop their own standards for judgment. The task has not been
easy, for the phrase "good moral character" has been acknowledged
as vague.1 7
In an early case which is still frequently cited, the court stated
that the phrase does not require moral excellence, but rather that
"[a] good moral character is one that measures up as good among
the people of the community in which the party lives; that is, up
to the standard of the average citizen."" 8 Subsequent cases have
also used community standards as the test." 9 However, some trib-
unals have sought to apply a national standard, 120 while others
116. Section 101 (f) of the 1952 I. & N. Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (f) provides
as follows:(f) For the purpose of this Act-
No person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person of good
moral character who, during the period for which good moral char-
acter is required to be established is, or was-(1) a habitual drunkard;(2) one who during such period has committed adultery;(3) a member of one or more of the classes of persons, whether
excludable or not, described in paragraphs (11), (12), and(31) of section 212(a) of this Act; or paragraphs (9), (10),
and (23) of section 212 (a), if the offense described therein, for
which such person was convicted or of which he admits the
commission, was committed during such period;(4) one whose income is derived principally from illegal gambling
activities;(5) one who has been convicted of two or more gambling offenses
during such period;(6) one who has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining
any benefits under this Act;(7) one who during such period has been confined, as a result of
conviction, to a penal institution for an aggregate period of one
hundred and eighty days or more, regardless of whether the
offense, or offenses, for which he has been confined were com-
mitted within or without such period;(8) who at any time has been convicted of the crime of murder.
The fact that any person is not within any of the foregoing classes
shall not preclude a finding that for other reasons such person is
or was not of good moral character.
117. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 263 (1956); Morrison v. State
Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 231-32, 461 P.2d 375, 388-89, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175,
188-89 (1969).
118. In re Hopp, 179 F. 561, 563 (E.D. Wis. 1910).
119. Petitions of Rudder, 159 F.2d 695 (2d Cir. 1947); Petition for Nat-
uralization of B., 154 F. Supp. 633 (D. Md. 1957); Application of Barug, 76
F. Supp. 407 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
120. Moon Ho Kim v. INS, 514 F.2d 179 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States
have suggested a standard that combines both.121
The courts have generally agreed that moral concepts are not sta-
tic and that the issue of good moral character must be determined
by standards prevalent at the time.122 Some cases have concluded
that moral standards are determined by the way citizens act.12
Others have recognized that a difference often exists between moral
precepts and actual conduct 24 and thus have relied on the former
as setting the applicable standard. 25  Although there is general
agreement that the personal moral views of the judge are not con-
trolling, 26 no consensus has developed about how a tribunal is to
ascertain what the community or national standards are.
Tadng a poll to determine what the common conscience is has
been rejected as impractical:
Even though we could take a poll, it would not be enough merely
to count heads, without any appraisal of the voters. A majority of
the votes of those in prisons and brothels, for instance, ought
scarcely to outweigh the votes of accredited churchgoers. Nor can
we see any reason to suppose that the opinion of clergymen would
be a more reliable estimate than our own. The situation is one in
which to proceed by any available method would not be more
likely to satisfy the impalpable standard, deliberately chosen, than
that we adopted in the foregoing cases: that is, to resort to our own
conjecture, fallible as we recognize it to be.' 2 7
And in a later case this same court stated:
Theoretically, perhaps we might take as the test whether those
who would approve the specific conduct would outnumber those
who would disapprove but it would be fantastically absurd to try
to apply it. So it seems to us that we are confined to the best guess
we can make of how such a poll would result.128
v. Francioso, 164 F.2d 163, 163 (2d Cir. 1947) ("moral feelings now prevalent
generally in this country"); Repouile v. United States, 165 F.2d 152 (2d
Cir. 1947); Petitions of Schroers, 336 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Peti-
tions of F.G. & E.E.G., 137 F. Supp. 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
121. E.g., Petition of Mayall, 154 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
122. Johnson v. United States, 186 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1951); Petitions of
Rudder, 159 F.2d 695 (2d Cir. 1947); Application of Barug, 76 F. Supp. 407
(N.D. Cal. 1948).
123. In re Orphanidis, 178 F. Supp. 872 (N.D. W. Va. 1959); Application
of Barug, 76 F. Supp. 407 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
124. E.g., Schmidt v. United States, 177 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1949).
125. Petition of F.G. & E.E.G., 137 F. Supp. 782, 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) ("It
is not a question of what the community does, but what the community
feels.").
126. Posusta v. United States, 285 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1961); In re Labady,
326 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Petition of O.N., 233 F. Supp. 504
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
127. Schmidt v. United States, 177 F.2d 450, 451-52 (2d Cir. 1949).
128. Johnson v. United States, 186 F.2d 588, 590 (2d Cir. 1951).
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In a subsequent case, the court rejected the notion that the test
is the personal moral principles of the individual judge or court
and stated that "the decision is to be based upon what he or it be-
lieves to be the ethical standards current at the time."'1 29
The problem is further complicated by the fact that the conduct
in issue may violate the criminal laws of the state where the alien
resides, but is not considered criminal in other jurisdictions. This
fact raises the additional questions of whether criminal or civil cri-
teria should be applied and of whether using a national standard
requires disregarding the vagaries of individual state laws. In the
light of these considerations, the specific types of sexual conduct




The question of whether an alien's commission of adultery during
the statutory period precludes a showing of good moral character
has vexed both courts and administrative tribunals for many years.
Apart from the problem of ascertaining just what the "common
conscience" is in this regard during times of steadily shifting sexual
mores, numerous factual variables have required reexamination of
previously settled standards.
Early decisions held that adultery was incompatible with ac-
cepted moral standards. Thus, a single act of adultery within the
statutory period precluded a showing of good moral character.18 0
When aliens remarried in the United States after getting rabbinical
divorces in New York which were invalid under the law of that
state, courts held that the remarriages were bigamous and adulter-
ous and therefore precluded a finding of good moral character.1 1
Later cases applied a more liberal approach and recognized extenu-
ating circumstances. Whenever parties married in good faith, un-
129. Posusta v. United States, 285 F.2d 533, 534-35 (2d Cir. 1961).
130. Estrin v. United States, 80 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1935); United States
v. Unger, 26 F.2d 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1928); United States v. Wexler, 8 F.2d 880
(E.D.N.Y. 1925).
131. United States v. Zaltzman, 19 F. Supp. 305 (W.D.N.Y. 1937); Petition
of Horwitz, 48 F.2d 652 (E.D.N.Y. 1931); In re Spiegel, 24 F.2d 605 (S.D.N.Y.
1928).
aware of an existing impediment occasioned by an invalid divorce,
courts held that the adultery was only technical and did not impugn
good moral character.13 2
In many cases, in which marital impediments were found, the ali-
ens were given administrative stays of deportation to allow them
to adjust their lifestyles in order to meet the good moral character
requirements for discretionary relief from deportation. 183 The
Board held that a later marriage of the parties cured any adultery
committed during the statutory period, concluding that "[b] y rea-
son of such marriage, all the antenuptial incontinence and lapses
from virtue were covered with oblivion."'1 34 Tn one case in which
an alien had lived in an adulterous relationship during the statu-
tory period, but the relationship had broken up, the Board
granted voluntary departure, stating, "[b]ut where, as in this
case, no one was injured, no family was broken up, and the public
was not offended, the Board believes that the alien, without another
blemish on his record, can be found to be a person of good moral
character."'1 35 However, good moral character was not found when
the aliens made no attempt to adjust their marital status and termi-
nate their illicit relationships.130
The courts take a more sympathetic view than does the Service
if extenuating circumstances exist even though the parties have not
adjusted their marital status by divorce and remarriage. In the
leading case of Petitions of Rudder, 37 the district court had granted
naturalization in a series of cases involving aliens who had mar-
ried and lived with their spouses over a long period of time, even
though the marriages were invalid because of known existing im-
pediments. On the Service's appeal, the judgments were affirmed.
The Second Circuit noted that the "morality" of the relationship
should be judged by the stability and faithfulness in the marital
relation, rather than by the legality of the marriage. 3 8
132. Petition of Smith, 71 F. Supp. 968 (D.N.J. 1947) (invalid mail-order
divorce); Petition of R., 56 F. Supp. 969 (D. Mass. 1944) (invalid mail-order
divorce); Petition of Schlau, 41 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), rev'd & re-
manded on other grounds sub nom. In re Schlau, 136 F.2d 480 (2d Cir.
1943) (invalid rabbinical divorce).
133. E.g., In re J., 2 I. & N. Dec. 876 (BIA, 1947).
134. In re E., 5 L & N. Dec. 522, 524 (BIA, 1953).
135. In re 0., 2 I. & N. Dec. 840, 852 (BIA, 1947). See also In re E., 5
I. & N. Dec. 522 (BIA, 1953); In re J., 2 I. & N. Dec. 892 (BIA, 1947).
136. In re L.Z., 3 I. & N. Dec. 478 (BIA, 1949); In re A., 3 I. & N. Dec.
567 (BIA, 1949).
137. 159 F.2d 695 (2d Cir. 1947).
138. Id. at 697-98.
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A new dimension was injected into the problem by the 1952 Act
provision which precludes a finding of good moral character in the
case of an alien who had committed adultery during the statutory
period. The legislative history of the provision is sparse;139 how-
ever, there can be little doubt that the liberality of the Rudder deci-
sion and others that followed was disturbing to the drafters of the
new code and provided much of the impetus for the restriction. De-
spite the congressional desire to avoid confusion and promote
greater uniformity of decision, the provision has had the opposite
effect. Because of the failure to define what it meant by the term
"adultery" or to indicate which standards it intended to apply, Con-
gress supplied a fruitful source of litigation, which continues to this
day without definitive resolution.
It is generally agreed that the preclusion provision in the
1952 Act did not contemplate what had previously been considered
"technical" adultery. Thus, when an alien remarried in good faith
after a mail-order Mexican divorce, which was invalid in New Jer-
sey (where he was remarried) and in New York (where he resided
with his first wife and children), the court reversed the Service's
denial of suspension of deportation for failure to establish good
moral character. The court held that even under the 1952 Act adul-
tery which was merely technical did not act as a bar.'4 Other trib-
unals have reached the same conclusion. 41
However, there has been disagreement about whether other ex-
tenuating circumstances may be considered under the 1952 Act. As
one court noted:
[T]he language of Section 1101 (f) (2), contemporaneous construc-
tion and (to a lesser extent) the legislative history support the
139. The legislative history is discussed in some detail in Petition of O.N.,
233 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Dickhoff v. Shaughnessy, 142 F. Supp.
535 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); In re Pitzoff, 10 1. & N. Dec. 35 (BIA, 1962). The
provision has been the subject of much critical comment-e.g., Strange, Pri-
vate Consensual Conduct and the Good Moral Character Requirement of
the Immigration and Nationality Act., 14 COLum. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 357
(1975); Comment, State Adultery Law and the "Good Moral Character"
Naturalization Requirement, 7 HAnv. J. LEGIs. 294 (1970).
140. Dickhoff v. Shaughnessy, 142 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
141. In re Johnson, 292 F. Supp. 380 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (unwitting adul-
tery); In re M.A., 7 I. & N. Dec. 365 (BIA, 1956); In re U., 7 I. & N. Dec.
380 (BIA, 1956); In re R.L., 6 I. & N. Dec. 463 (BTA, 1954); In re Greulich,
117 A.2d 316 (County Ct., N.J. 1955). Contra, Petition of Da Silva, 140 F.
Supp. 596 (D.N.J. 1956).
view that when Congress for the first time stated that adultery
was inconsistent with good moral character, it intended to pre-
clude a court from considering extenuating circumstances of the
sort deemed controlling in Rudder.142
Other courts have held that the alien's present legal marriage to
the erstwhile paramour does not cure the adultery which occurred
during the statutory period, for "[t]he offense of adultery is com-
plete even if it existed for a single day. ' 14 3 The current Service
position is that if an alien has engaged in culpable marital miscon-
duct during the statutory period, the wrong is not cured merely
because the parties to the misconduct later marry.
1 44
However some courts have held that extenuating circumstances
may be considered mitigation.'4 5 Thus, when the marriage is ques-
tion was factually at an end,140 or when the adulterous intercourse
did not contribute to the breakup of a marriage,147 or when the
parties thereafter marry, 48 a finding of good moral character is not
precluded under the 1952 Act. The Service currently maintains
that good moral character is not barred by sexual misconduct with-
out cohabitation if the marriage had ceased to be viable and intact
before the commission of the adultery, but that a different rule ap-
plies if the sexual conduct amounts to adulterous cohabitation. 14
When illicit intercourse takes place during the existence of a viable
and intact marriage, a finding of good moral character is precluded
"without regard to whether such misconduct did or did not disrupt
or destroy the marriage, whether the innocent spouse was aware
or ignorant of the misconduct .. .
142. Petition of O.N., 233 F. Supp. 504, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). See also
Brea-Garcia v. INS, 531 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1976); In re Russo, 259 F. Supp.
230 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
143. In re C., 6 I. & N. Dec. 675, 678 (BIA, 1955). See also In re Russo,
259 F. Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Petitions of F.G. & E.E.G., 137 F. Supp
782 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); In re W.Y.S., 6 1. & N. Dec. 801 (BIA, 1955).
144. INS, I WRPEATIONS § 316.1(f) (6), at 5246.8-9 (1971); id. §
316.1 (g) (2) (vi), at 5248.2.5.
145. Cabrera v. INS, 415 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1969); Petition of Schroers,
336 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); In re R.E., 290 F. Supp. 281 (S.D. Ill.
1968); In re E., 253 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Mich. 1966); In re Briedis, 238 F.
Supp. 149 (N.D. ll. 1965).
146. Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1964); In re Edgar, 253 F.
Supp. 951 (E.D. Mich. 1966); In re Briedis, 238 F. Supp. 149 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
147. Moon Ho Kim v. INS, 514 F.2d 179 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
148. Petition of Schroers, 336 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); In re Edgar,
253 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Mich. 1966); In re Briedis, 238 F. Supp. 149 (N.D.
Ill. 1965).
149. INS, INTERP~RTATIONS § 316.1(g) (2) (vi), at 5248.2.5-6 (1974).
150. Id. § 316.1(g) (2) (vi), at 5248.2.5.
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Further confusion is engendered by the failure of Congress to in-
dicate any standard for determining what it meant by adultery. If
the crime of adultery was contemplated, there is a vast disparity
among the laws of the states about which sexual acts are crimi-
nal.15 1 For example, under Pennsylvania law, sexual intercourse
by an unmarried man with a married woman constitutes fornication
and not adultery.152 In New Jersey, intercourse by a married man
with a woman other than his wife constitutes fornication and not
adultery, unless the woman is married. 153 And in California, adul-
tery is not a crime unless there is cohabitation. 54
This disparity in the criminal laws of the states has led various
tribunals to construe the 1952 Act's adultery provision as mandat-
ing a uniform national standard, with oddly inconsistent results.
One theory is that a uniform national standard cannot be based on
the vagaries of state law and that Congress must have contemplated
a rule which takes into account extenuating circumstances. 155 An-
other theory holds that, in view of the conflicting state criminal
laws, section 101 (f) (2) must be construed in terms of the civil law
of the various states, which uniformly declare adultery to be a
ground for divorce. 56
The Board has utilized both standards, based upon its view "that
Congress' desire that there be uniformity related not to the method
to be used in determining whether adultery has been committed,
but related rather to the desire that all persons who had committed
adultery should be barred from the prizes of the law."'157 Thus,
when the substantive criminal law of the state made adultery a
crime, the Board used a criminal standard as a basis for finding
151. The variances are discussed in some detail in Brea-Garcia v. INS,
531 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1976); In re Johnson, 292 F. Supp. 381, 382-83
(E.D.N.Y. 1968). See also Comment, State Adultery Laws and the "Good
Moral Character" Naturalization Requirement, 7 HARv. J. LEGIS. 295, 300-
01 (1970); Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homo-
sexual Conduct, 72 MIcH. L. Rv. 1613, 1622-23, nn.65, 66, & 67 (1974).
152. In re Sotos, 221 F. Supp. 145 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
153. Brea-Garcia v. INS, 531 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1976).
154. Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1964).
155. Moon Ho Kim v. INS, 514 F.2d 179 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Petition of
Schroers, 336 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); In re Briedis, 233 F. Supp. 149
(N.D. IMI. 1965).
156. Brea-Garcia v. INS, 531 F.2d 693 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
157. In re Pitzoff, 10 I. & N. Dec. 35, 37 (BIA, 1962) (emphasis added).
a lack of good moral character. The Board applied this standard
even though the state statute did not provide any punishment for
the crime unless the spouse prosecutes, and here the alien's wife
had elected not to prosecute.'58 When the sexual act in question
did not constitute a crime under the state law, the Board used a
civil standard as a basis for denial.15 9 The Service has adopted the
position that the distinction between civil and criminal standards
is not decisive.160
The limitation in the 1952 Act has engendered confusion and has
raised questions about whether it does not unduly restrict the
courts from taking into account prevailing standards. It can hardly
be doubted that a marked change in public attitudes toward permis-
sible sexual behavior has occurred during the years since 1952. Ex-
tramarital sex has been recognized as on the increase, not only
on the part of men but also on the part of women. 0 1 Additionally
it is common knowledge that many couples now live together in
stable relationships without being married. The Service position
that otherwise unobjectionable sexual relations become immoral if
there is cohabitation invites Service officers to snoop even further
into the intimate details of an alien's private life.102 This position
also indicates how far the Service and the courts have deviated
from the realistic approach utilized in Petitions of Rudder.1 3
The current confusion indicates that the best service the Congress
can now perform in this regard is to wipe the slate clean by remov-
ing section 101(f) (2) from the Act. Administrative agencies and
the courts would ascertain what is the common conscience and
would work out practical standards in light of current realities.
158. In re Yee, 13 I. & N. Dec. 785 (BIU, 1971). See also In re W.Y.S.,
6 I. & N. Dec. 801 (BIA, 1955).
159. In re P., 7 I. & N. Dec. 376 (BIA, 1956); In re M., 6 I. & N. Dec.
660 (BIA, 1955). See also In re C., 6 I. & N. Dec. 675 (BIA, 1955).
160. INS, INTmPPE-TATONS § 316.1(g) (2) (iv), at 5248.2.1 (1975).
161. In a recent Redbook survey conducted among 100,000 female sub-
scribers, about one-third of the married women reported having had sexual
relations with men other than their husbands. Of working wives, almost
half had done so. Levin, The Redbook Report on Premarital and Extra-
marital Sex, REmroox, Oct. 1975, at 40, 42.
162. See, e.g., In re Van Dessel, 243 F. Supp. 328, 329 (E.D. Pa. 1965),
in which the question and answer statement taken by the Service from the
alien contained inquiries about whether the couple continued to have sexual
relations, when the last time was, where did it occur, does he spend the
night at her apartment, how many times has he stayed over, how frequently
do they have sexual relations, did they ever register as husband and wife,
did she ever represent herself as his wife, etc.
163. 159 F.2d 695, 697 (2d Cir. 1947).
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Fornication
The question of whether and to what extent an unmarried per-
son's heterosexual and private love life bears upon his good moral
character has been the subject of much discussion throughout the
years. Only recently have the courts held that a single person's
sexual relations, although constituting fornication under the crimi-
nal laws of some jurisdictions, do not impugn his good moral char-
acter.
Some of the earlier decisions adopted the opposite view, and some
even exhibited what seems to be a double standard. The Service
argued that acts of fornication on the part of either sex were in-
compatible with societal norms. In one case involving an unmar-
ried man who admitted that he had had meretricious relations with
a single woman for pay, the court of appeals sitting en banc divided
evenly.16 4 In another case, involving not only fornication but also
cohabitation, naturalization was denied for lack of good moral char-
acter.165 In one early case, a single woman's marriage to a man,
divorced by his first wife, during the period of the divorce decree's
conditional prohibition against remarriage was held invalid and
thus precluded a showing of good moral character. 166
The trend, however, is toward greater tolerance if the subject of
the inquiry was unmarried. In the leading case of Schmidt v.
United States,167 a single man who had had sexual relations with
single women was not precluded from showing good moral charac-
ter. The Second Circuit noted the then recent Kinsey investigation
into "the actual habits of men in the petitioner's position, and they
have disclosed-what few people would have doubted in any event
-that his practice is far from uncommon."'168  Subsequent cases
164. United States v. Manfredi, 168 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1943). Because the
court divided evenly, no opinion was issued. However, the facts of the case
were referred to in a later decision, Schmidt v. United States, 177 F.2d 450,
451 (2d Cir. 1949). I appeared for the Government before the court of ap-
peals en banc in the Manfredi case. One of the incidents involved took
place in Atlantic City. In response to a question from the bench about per-
tinent standards, I had referred to some of the recent court holdings. I
can still hear Judge Biggs' next question: 'Do you think the moral feelings
of the people of Atlantic City would be outraged by this behavior?"
165. Petition of Pacora, 96 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
166. Petition of Axelrod, 25 F. Supp. 415 (E.D.N.Y. 1938).
167. 177 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1949).
168. Id. at 451-52.
held that sexual relations by an unmarried alien do not impugn
good moral character, regardless of the alien's gender.0 9 However,
in one peculiar case naturalization was denied to an unmarried
woman who lived in a hotel room that had a connecting door with
a room occupied by a man with whom she admitted having had
sexual relations on one occasion under extenuating circum-
stances.17
0
In a recent case, the court recognized changes that had taken
place "in national standards of morality during the postwar dec-
ades" and referred to the "obvious change in the mores of society
concerning family formation."'171 Another court granted natural-
ization to an unmarried women whose sexual relations with a mar-
ried man did not constitute adultery. The court indicated that the
decision might have been otherwise if promiscuity or an illegimate
child had been involved.172 However, another court granted nat-
uralization to an alien who had fathered an illegimate child, noting:
"That the possibility of conception exists whenever sexual relations
take place cannot be debated. Because conception took place in this
instance should not render petitioner any more immoral than if it
had not taken place. ' 173
The Service's current position is that fornication alone, whether
or not accompanied by cohabitation, does not impugn good moral
character 74 unless the other party is married. If the other party
169. Posusta v. United States, 285 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1961) (single woman
lived with married father of her children prior to statutory period and con-
tinued to live with him without marriage even after his wife was granted
a divorce; finally married him within statutory period); In re Mortyr, 320
F. Supp. 1222 (D. Ore. 1970) (single alien lived with single man who
wanted to marry her, but she refused); In re Garstka, 295 F. Supp. 833
('W.D. Mlich. 1969) (alien widower had sexual relations with single woman
who gave birth to a child which he acknowledged and supported pursuant
to court order); In re Van Dessel, 243 F. Supp. 328 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (divorced
woman had sexual relations with single man whom she refused to marry
because of religious differences); In re Sotos, 221 F. Supp. 145 (W.D. Pa.
1963) (unmarried alien had sexual relations with his landlord's wife; under
Pennsylvania criminal law this conduct constituted fornication, which was
not a felony); In re Denessy, 200 F. Supp. 354 (D. Del. 1961) (single alien
had sexual relations with single woman who wanted to marry him, but he
refused); In re Kielblock, 163 F. Supp. 687 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (unmarried
alien had sexual relations several times with married man whose wife had
obtained interlocutory divorce decree; not adultery under California law be-
cause adultery required cohabitation).
170. Flumerfelt v. United States, 230 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1956).
171. In re Mortyr, 320 F. Supp. 1222, 1223-24 (D. Ore. 1970).
172. In re Kielblock, 163 F. Supp. 687 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
173. In re Garstka, 295 F. Supp. 833, 834 (W.D. MVich. 1969).
174. INS, INTERPRETATIONS § 316.1(f) (6), at 5246.7-8 (1974).
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is married and "maintaining a viable, intact marriage" a finding of
good moral character is precluded.175 It is not clear whether a "via-
ble, intact marriage" would encompass an open marriage, in which
both partners agree to tolerate mutual sexual freedom. No such
case has yet arisen.
If the misconduct does not disrupt or destroy the marriage, the
Service position presents somewhat of an anomaly. In a recent
court decision which the Service did not challenge further,176 a
married man who had sexual relations with an unmarried woman
was held not to be precluded from showing good moral character
because his marriage did not break up. Nevertheless, in the Serv-
ice's view, good moral character on the part of the unmarried
women would be impugned.
In the main, the courts seem to have agreed with the attitude
expressed some years ago that "[t]he satisfaction of sexual appetite
is a peculiarly private matter, ordinarily concerning only the par-
ticipants in the sexual act." 177
Deviate Sex Acts
Crimes based on deviate sexual conduct, usually manifesting
some public behavior which is considered offensive, have been held
to involve moral turpitude. Whether such acts are immoral when
performed in private by consenting adults is another issue, one to-
ward which there appears to be increasing tolerance. Considerable
change has taken place since a court declared that any conduct out-
side "the normal sexual act," even by husband and wife in private,
could be punished as a criminal offense.178 A growing body of evi-
dence reveals that sexual activities heretofore considered unortho-
dox may be more common than had previously been supposed.17 9
175. Id. § 316.1 (f) (6), at 5246.8-9.
176. Moon Ho Kim v. INS, 514 F.2d 179 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
177. In re Kielblock, 163 F. Supp. 687 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
178. State v. Nelson, 199 Mlinn. 47, 271 N.W. 114, 118 (1937): "Thus hus-
band and wife, if violating this [sodomy] statute could undoubtedly be
punished, whereas the normal sexual act would not only be legal but per-
haps entirely proper." Could the use of the "perhaps" indicate some doubt
in the court's mind that "the normal sexual act" is entirely proper, even
between husband and wife?
179. The recent Redbook magazine survey of 100,000 women subscribers
reflects that
oral-genital sex is an almost universal experience. It is practiced
In 1959, a New Jersey court observed that "[f] ew behavioral de-
viations are more offensive to American mores than is homosexual-
ity."' °80 A decade later, naturalization was denied to an alien
woman who privately engaged in homosexual practices with con-
senting adults in her own home; the court concluded that no reason
existed to believe the practice had become generally accepted. 181
Nevertheless, judicial attitudes toward sexual deviancy are begin-
ning to change. In the case of a man who described himself as "bi-
sexual with homosexual tendencies," the court found the petitioner
"no more than an ailing person whose compulsive behavior, private,
unobtrusive and noncriminal, does not offend community standards
unless brought to its notice by official inquisition."'1 2 In another
case, a court granted naturalization to an admitted homosexual.
The court emphasized that private conduct should not be deemed
violative of public morality.183 Similarly the Second Circuit, in af-
firming the denial of a homosexual's naturalization petition because
he had testified falsely concerning his homosexual activities, made
it plain that the denial was not based on those activities them-
selves:
We pause to note what we are not holding. Petitioner is not be-
ing denied naturalization for his sexual activities-but rather for
his lack of candor under oath. This is not a case like Labady,...
where the applicant testified truthfully about prior homosexual
acts, yet still was granted naturalization because of the private
character of his sexual life. Had Kovacs testified truthfully about
his past, the petition might well have been granted. 8 4
In the most recent case, the court took into account current devel-
opments regarding homosexuality and concluded "that the commu-
nity regards homosexual behavior between consenting adults with
tolerance, if not indifference."'185 The homosexual alien was found
with varying frequency by 9 out of 10 women under the age of
40 and by 8 out of 10 women who are 4D or older. Husbands and
wives share about equally in giving each other pleasure-there is
no appreciable difference in the extent to which the wife is likely
to play the active role (fellatio) or the husband (cunnilingus).
Levin & Levin, Sexual Pleasure: The Surprisng Preferences of 100,000
Women, REDBOOi, Sept. 1975, at 52.
180. H. v. H., 157 A.2d 721, 727 (N.J. Super. 1959).
181. In re Schmidt, 289 N.Y.2d 89 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
182. In re M.B., Civil No. 631121 (E.D.N.Y., Feb. 19, 1969). Although the
decision is unreported, it is digested at 46 IirnRama REzLExss 78 (1969),
and it is referred to in In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924, 926 n.2, 928 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
183. In re Labady, 326 F. Supp. 924, 927-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
184. Kovacs v. United States, 476 F.2d 843, 845 (2d Cir. 1973) (footnote
omitted).
185. In re Brodie, 394 F. Supp. 1208, 1211 (D. Ore. 1975).
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to be a person of good moral character, and his naturalization peti-
tion was granted.
Notwithstanding the change which has occurred in judicial atti-
tudes the Service continues to adhere to the view that deviate sex-
ual conduct precludes a showing of good moral character:
The Service holds that a petitioner for naturalization who is or
has been a practicing sexual deviate, a homosexual, during the rele-
vant statutory period is precluded from establishing the good moral
character required for admission to citizenship. Moreover, this
rule shall prevail even though performance of the homosexual
act (s) in question does not constitute a violation of relevant state
law; and even though the conduct engaged in was purely private
and not public or was the result compulsive behavior. 8 6
Incest
Whether a sexual relationship between close relatives precludes
good moral character is dependent upon the facts of each case. Good
moral character was found in a case in which an uncle and his niece
had married and had children. Twenty-two years later, after learn-
ing that the marriage was illegal in New York, they were remarried
by a rabbi in Rhode Island, where such marriages are valid. The
court held that although the marriage was incestuous under New
York law, the valid Rhode Island marriage should be recognized,
and the naturalization petition was granted. 8 7 This decision was
followed a few years later by another case involving an uncle and
niece who, concealing their relationship, were married in 1925 in
Connecticut, where such marriages are unlawful. The couple now
had four children. The district court granted naturalization, and
the court of appeals affirmed on the Service's appeal, despite the
fact that the parties were not legally married. The court reiterat-
ing its view that "[t] he trend of recent naturalization decisions is
to stress stability and faithfulness in the 'marital' relationship
rather than the mere legality of ties .... ,,188
However, a naturalized citizen convicted of pre-naturalization in-
cestuous relationships with his daughters was held to lack the good
moral character required for naturalization, and his citizenship was
186. INS, INTERPRE.ATioNS § 316.1(f) (7) at 5246.10 (1973) (footnotes
omitted).
187. Petition of Lieberman, 50 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.NY. 1943).
188. United States v. Francioso, 164 F.2d 163, 164 (2d Cir. 1947).
revoked.1 8 9 Adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act was
denied because of poor moral character to an applicant who was
living with his first cousin pursuant to an fllinois marriage re-
garded as criminally incestuous by the laws of that state.190
SHAM MARRIAGES
Aliens who seek priority in the issuance of immigrant visas on
the basis of marriage to a United States citizen or to a legally resi-
dent alien sometimes resort to sham marriages. The number of
such fraudulent marriages is on the increase,' 91 and the Service is
exercising great efforts to detect them. One means used to deter-
mine the bona fides of the alleged marital relationship is to ques-
tion separately both parties to the relationship about the details of
their life together in order to ascertain whether meaningful discrep-
ancies indicate a sham marriage. Sometimes the questions involve
intimate details of their relationship. 92 In a recent case in which
it had been concluded administratively that the marriage was not
bona fide because of the parties' separations and the wife's freedom
of action, the court of appeals reversed, stating: "The bona fides
of a marriage do not and cannot rest on either marital partner's
choice about his or her mobility after marriage."'
9 3
SOM CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing survey, however incomplete and sketchy, should
indicate that changes are long overdue in official thinking on the
criteria governing the sex lives of the many aliens in our midst.
Unless we are to acknowledge a double standard, a rigid one for
aliens and a more flexible one for the rest of us, the hands of the
administrators and the courts should not be tied by statutory re-
strictions which prevent them from taking into account the shift
in sexual mores evidenced by changing actions and attitudes on the
part of the general populace. Certainly section 101(f) of the Act
has long demonstrated its uselessness as a gauge, not only with re-
189. United States v. Vanderjagt, 135 F. Supp. 676 (W.D. Mich. 1955).
190. In re S., 8 I. & N. Dec. 234 (BIA, 1958).
191. 1975 INS, AtouAL REPORT 18.
192. In one case which came before the Board, the Service had denied
a visa petition because of doubt about the bona fides of the marriage; the
alien beneficiary of the visa petition, a dapper young man, had admitted
on Service questioning that he continued to date other women. At oral ar-
gument before the Board, his attorney contended that the marriage was en-
tered into in good faith and subsisted. Asked how he could reconcile this
position with the alien's acknowledged extramarital performances, counsel
responded, "That's simple. He cheats on his wife."
193. Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1975).
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gard to adultery, but also with regard to other proscribed conduct.
The repeal of section 101 (f) would help to restore the problem to
the arena where realistic solutions are feasible.
Apart from the unfairness to the aliens affected, these unneces-
sary statutory mandates waste Government resources sorely needed
elsewhere. The snooping into aliens' private lives now required by
law is undoubtedly embarrassing not only to the aliens but also
to the Service personnel compelled to do the snooping. Beyond
that, precious official time and effort are wasted by an agency en-
trusted with an important mission in which it publicly acknowl-
edges it will fail for lack of resources.
Section 244(e)of the Act, which requires good moral character
for the privilege of voluntary departure, is another instance of the
frustration of official efforts by outmoded legislation. An alien
seeking to enter the United States need not establish good moral
character. Yet, if he remains here illegally and wishes to depart
voluntarily at his own expense, he is not permitted to do so and
must be deported at Government expense unless he first establishes
good moral character for the statutory five-year period!
This requirement not only involves all concerned in the tedious
procedures needed for the resolution of such issues. But it also ac-
tually frustrates the enforcement of the laws. There are times
when the Service, periodically confronted with temporary shortages
of funds, rearranges its priorities and temporarily suspends the exe-
cution of deportation orders in order to avoid transportation
charges. Deportable aliens who would otherwise long since have
left the country at their own expense if granted voluntary depar-
ture are thus permitted to remain here and to hold jobs. To the
degree that the good moral character requirement impedes the
grant of voluntary departure, it is not only an anomaly but also
an obstacle to realistic and effective law enforcement. Certain-
ly Congress, in its current deliberations over amendments to the
Act, should give some thought to these additional changes called
for by experience throughout the years.
